Philosophy of Perception

This field addresses the mental-consciousness nature of sensory-perceptional experience. It includes issues such as the differences between perceptional experience to other mental states, like belief and judgment, on the one hand, and sensory perceptions, like pain and pleasure, on the other hand. These discussions encompass both the functionality of perceptional experiences and the nature of perceptional content. In this context, we discuss the status of the phenomenological nature of perception (e.g., how a red light “appears” in our consciousness) which seemingly distinguishes sensory experiences from other cognitive states. This field also studies the epistemic status of sensory perception: the aspect of perception that makes it a source of information about the outer world; questions of if and how we can justify art through the experience of perception; if perception lacks conceptual content, how is it possible that it can be a justification to beliefs and a source of knowledge; do cognitive states, like beliefs, might influence perceptional experiences, and if they do, what are the consequences for the status of the sensory perception’s justifications; and more.