Prof. David Widerker
AOS: Free Will, Action Theory, Metaphysics
AOC: Philosophy of Language, Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophical Logic, Philosophy of Religion
CV
Home Address/phone
Josef Nakarstr.
Petach-Tiqwah, 494773
Israel / Tel: +972-3/921-3276 (H); +972-50/811-3206 (Cell)
EDUCATION
B.A. in Philosophy and Mathematics at Bar-Ilan University 1970.
M.A. in Philosophy at Bar-Ilan University 1975. M.A. Thesis: On Identity
Ph.D in Philosophy at Bar-Ilan University, Summa Cum Laude, 1982
Ph.D. Thesis: The Logic of Events and Actions: A Modified Davidsonian Approach.
AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION
Free Will, Action Theory, Metaphysics
AREAS OF COMPETENCE
Philosophy of Language, Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophical Logic, Philosophy of Religion
HISTORY OF ACADEMIC APPOINTMENTS:
1984-89 Lecturer in Philosophy at the Bar-Ilan University
1989-94 Senior Lecturer at Bar-Ilan University (tenure as of 1990)
1995-2001 Associate Professor at Bar-Ilan University
2002 - Full Professor
VISITING APPOINTMENTS
1985-86 Post Doctoral Fellow at Sage School of Philosophy at Cornell University
1986-87 Research Associate at the Center for Philosophy of Religion at the Umiversity of Notre Dame
1993-4 Visiting Research Scholar at the University of Toronto
1998-99 Visiting Research Scholar at the University of British Columbia
FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS
1974 Bar-Ilan Award for the Outstanding Masters Student
1976 Landau Award for Doctoral Students
1986 Post Doctoral Fellowship at the Center for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Notre Dame
1993 Research Fellowship at University of Toronto
1998 Research Fellowship at University of British Columbia
2010 Research fellowship at the Berlin School of Mind and Brain , and directing Philosophy Discussion
Group on Free Will there.
2010 Research on Free Will at the Free Univ. of Amsterdam financed by the Dutch Science Foundation
(NWO).
2011 Research on Free Will at the Free Univ. of Amsterdam financed by the Dutch Science Foundation
(NWO).
2012 Research on Free Will at the Free Univ. of Amsterdam financed by the Dutch Science Foundation
(NWO).
2011 Four-Year Research Program on Libertarian Free Will funded by Israeli Science Foundation
2013 Research on Free Will at the Free Univ. of Amsterdam by the Templeton Foundation.
2013 Research Fellowship at the Berlin School of Mind and Brain
2014 Research on Free Will at the Free Univ. of Amsterdam financed by the Templeton Foundation.
PROFFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES
1992 Organized two Guest Lectures on the topic of Divine Knowledge
1995 Organized two Guest Lectures on the topic of Human Freedom
1998 Organized two Guest Lectures on the topic of God, Freedom,and Evil
1993-94 Directed a Philosophy Discussion Group at the University of Toronto
1998-99 Directed a Philosophy Discussion Group on Free Will at the University of British Columbia
2001-02 Directed a Directed a Philosophy Discussion Group on Free Will whose members are philosophers
from various Israeli universities.
2004-05 Directed a Philosophy Discussion Group on Free Will at the University of British Columbia
2009 Organized a Philosophy Workshop centering on the philosophical work of Peter van Inwagen.
2010 Directed a three months a Discussion Group on the topic of Free Will at the Berlin School of Mind
and Brain.
GRADUATE STUDENTS
Lior Lavi Ph.D 2007 - The Coherence of the Libertarian Approach to Free Will
Ayala Yaniv Ph.D 2008 - Identity or Identification: A Defense of a Radical Psychological Theory of Survival
Boz Kelman Ph.D - Theistic Responses to the Evidential Argument from Evil
REFEREE
Referee for American Philosophical Quarterly, Australasian Journal for Philosophy, Erkenntnis,
Ethics, Faith and Philosophy, Grazer Philosophische Studien, Iyun, Mind, Philosophia,
Philosophical Imprint, Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophical Studies, Synthese.
COURSES AND SEMINARS TAUGHT
Philosophy of Religion, Action Theory, Free Will and Moral Responsibility,
Metaphysics, Logic, Philosophical Logic, Selected Topics in Philosphy of Mind,
Selected Topics in Philosophy of Language.
TALKS AND INVITED LECTURES
1988 "Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom" Risley College Cornell University
1990 "Problem for the Eternity Solution" at the conference of the Israeli Philosophical Association
- "Providence, Eternity and Human Freedom: A Reply to Stump and Kretzmann " at the colloquium of
the philosophy department of Tel-Aviv University
1994 "The Eternity Solution to the Freeedom-Foreknowledge Dilemma" Colloquium talk at the University
of Toronto
- "Frankfurt’s Argument Against PAP" talk delivered for a research group in philosophy at the University
of British Columbia
- "Responsibility and Avoidability" delivered at the annual meeting of the Israeli Philosophical Association
2001 "Agent-Causation and Control" delivered for a research group in philosophy at Bar-Ilan University
- "Farewell to the Direct Argument" delivered at the annual meeting of the Israeli Philosophical
Association
- "God’s Beliefs are not Hard-Type Soft Facts" Conference on "God, Free Will, & Determinism,"
McMurry University, Abilene, Texas.
- "Blameworthiness, Non-Robust Alternatives, and the Principle of Alternative Expectations," talk
delivered at Western Washington University, Bellingham WA
- "Blameworthiness, Non-robust Alternatives, and the Principle of Alternative Expectations," INPC
Conference on Free Will and Determinism, Moscow, Idaho.
- "Comments on John Fischer's article "The Direct Argument: You Say Goodbye, I Say Hello," OPC2 Online Conference in Philosophy .
2008 "A Defense of Frankfurt-Friendly Libertarianism," Workshop on Belief, Responsibility and Action,
November 12-14, Valencia.
2009 "Frankfurt-type Libertarianism" Workshop on Free Will and Responsibility, October14, University
of Nantes, to be delivered.
2010 "Frankfurt-type Libertarianism" at the School of Mind and Brain in Berlin.
2013 Invitation to an APA Symposium on Compatibilism whose focus was my paper [together with Ira
Schnall] "The Direct Argument and the Burden of Proof" published in Analysis in 2012.
Publications
1. "A Note on Sharvy," Philosophia 3 (1973), pp.498-499.
2. "Epistemic Opacity Again," Philosophical Studies 32 (1977), pp.355-358.
3. "Identity, Indiscernibility and Geach," Logique et Analyse 94 (1981), pp. 211-221.
4. "The Extensionality Argument," Nous 27 (1983), pp. 457-468.
5. "Davidson on Singular Causal Sentences," Erkenntnis 23 (1985), pp.223-242.
6. "On an Argument for Incompatibilism," Analysis 55 (1987) pp.37-41.
7. "Facts, Freedom and Foreknowledge," [together with Eddy M. Zemach] Religious Studies (1987), pp.19-
28.
8. "Action Sentences," Erkenntnis 28 (1988), pp. 269-291.
9. "Fatalism," Logique et Analyse (1987) pp. 229-234.
10. "Bechirato Hachofshit Shel Haadam Mul Iyediat Hakol Shel Hael," in Hebrew Iyyun 37 (1988), pp.25-36.
11. "Two Forms of Fatalism," in John M. Fischer (ed.) God, Freedom and Knowledge. Stanford University
Press 1989.
12. "Two Fallacious Objections to Adams' Soft/hard Fact Distinction," Philosophical Studies 57 (1989),
pp.103-107.
13. "In Defense of Davidson's Thesis Regarding Action Individuation," Dialectica 43 (1990), pp.281-289.
14. "Troubles with Ockhamism," The Journal of Philosophy 87 (1990), pp.462-480.
15. "A Problem for the Eternity Solution," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 29 (1991), pp.87-95.
16. "Frankfurt on 'Ought Implies Can' and Alternate Possibilities," Analysis 51 (1991) pp. 222-224.
Anthologized in Jacek Holowka (ed.) Filozofia Moralnosci. Fundacja Aletheia 1998.Translated into
Polish.)
17. "Anomalous Monism and Cartesian Intuitions," Grazer Philosophiesche Studien, 43 (1992), pp.95-100.
18. Review of B. Berofsky's Freedom from Necessity: The Metaphysical Basis of Responsibility. New
York and London: Routledge and Kegan Paul [together with Charlotte Katzoff] The Journal of
Philosophy 90 (1993), pp.98-105.
19. "Providence, Eternity and Human Freedom: A Reply to Stump and Kretzmann," Faith and Philosophy 11
(1994), pp.242-254.
20. "Zimmerman on Obligation, Responsibility, and Alternate Possibilities," [together with Charlotte Katzoff]
Analysis 53 (1994), pp. 284-287.
21. "Libertarian Freedom and the Avoidability of Decisions," Faith and Philosophy 12 (1995), pp.112-118.
22. "Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternate Possibilities," Philosophical Review 104 (1995),
pp.247-261. Anthologized in Laura Ekstrom (ed.) Agency and Responsibility:
Essays on The Metaphysics of Freedom, Westview Press 2000; and in Gary Watson(ed.)
Free Will. Oxford University Press 2002.
23. "Contra Snapshot Ockhamism," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 39 (1996), pp.95-102.
24. "Avoidability and Libertarianism," [together with Charlotte Katzoff] Faith and Philosophy
13 (1996), pp.415-421.
25. "Theological Fatalism and Its Irrelevance to Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative
Possibilities," Faith and Philosophy 17 (2000), pp.259-254.
26. "Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: A Further Look,"
Philosophical Topics 14 (2000), pp.181-201.
27. "Responsibility and Frankfurt-type Examples," in Robert Kane (ed.) The Oxford Handbook on Free Will,
Oxford University Press 2002, pp.323-34.
28. "Why God's Beliefs are not Hard-Type Soft Facts," Religious Studies 38 (2002), pp.77-88
29. "Farewell to the Direct Argument," Journal of Philosophy. 99 (2002), pp.316-324.
30. "Blameworthiness and Alternative Possibilities," in David Widerker and Michael McKenna eds. Moral
Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities, Ashgate Press 2003, pp.53-74.
31. Introduction to Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities [together with Michael McKenna],
David Widerker and Michael McKenna eds., Ashgate Press 2002, pp.1-16.
32. "Agent Causation and the Control-Problem," Faith and Philosophy 22 (2005), pp. 88-98.
33. "Blameworthiness, Non-robust Alternatives, and the Principle of Alternative Expectations," Midwest
Studies in Philosophy 29 (2005), pp.292-306.
34. "Libertarianism and the Philosophical Significance of Frankfurt Scenarios," The Journal of Philosophy
103 (2006), pp. 163–187.
35. "Some Further Thoughts on the Direct Argument," in Nick Trakakis & Daniel Cohen (eds.) Essays on
Free Will and Moral Responsibility Cambridge Scholars 2008, pp. 224-233.
36. "A Defence of Frankfurt-Friendly Libertarianism," Philosophical Explorations 12 (2009): 87–108.
37. "Frankfurt-Friendly Libertarianism," in Robert Kane (ed.) The Oxford Handbook on Free Will, 2nd edition
Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 266-287.
38. "The Direct Argument and the Burden of Proof," [together with Ira Schnall] Analysis 72 (2012): 1-13.
39. "Parfit, Meaning of Life, and What is Essential to Survival," (in Hebrew). [together with Ayala Yaniv]
Iyyun 60 (2011): 307-331. (in Hebrew)
40. "The Direct Argument for the Incompatibility of Moral Responsibility and Determinism," [together
with Ira Schnall] in David Palmer (ed.) Libertarian Free Will, Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 88-106.
41. "Fischer against the Dilemma Defense: The Defense Prevails,"[together with Stewart Goetz],
Analysis 73 (2013): 283-295.
42. "On the Luck Objection to Libertarianism," [together with Ira Schnall.] Forthcoming in Carlos Moya,
Andrei Buckareff, and Sergi Rosell (eds.) Agency and Responsibility, Palgrave-Macmillan, 2015.
Books edited:
Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities, David Widerker and Michael McKenna eds., Ashgate Press 2003.
Work in Progress
A book on free will
The Moral of Taylor's Osmo-story
Refutation of Baker's defence of compatibilism
Refutation of John Fischer's Semi-Compatibilism
Last Updated Date : 14/09/2022
